On February 21, 2007, the Plaintiff was riding in the front passenger seat of a vehicle driven by her friend, the Defendant. As the Defendant proceeded through an intersection, a van broadsided the driver’s side door of her vehicle. The impact was reasonably severe and caused significant damage to the left side of the Defendant’s vehicle. Although the Plaintiff was wearing her seatbelt, she claimed that the force of the collision caused the right side of her body to strike the interior of the Defendant’s vehicle.
Tag: motor vehicle injury
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On December 23, 2011, the BC Supreme Court released a decision on the use of video surveillance evidence in a motor vehicle accident case. In WILKINSON V. WHITLOCK, 2011 BCSC 1781 the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 motor vehicle accident in Vernon, BC. The Defendant was found completely at fault after it was determined that she drove through a red light and collided with the Plaintiff’s vehicle. As a result of the collision, the Plaintiff claimed that she suffered an injury to her back. During the trial, the Plaintiff testified about her symptoms.
The British Columbia Supreme Court recently held that the number of visits to a doctor’s office does not determine the value of the Plaintiff’s personal injury claim. In TARZWELL V. EWASHINA, the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision in 2007 and suffered soft tissue injuries to the lower back and trapezius muscle. After she was injured, the Plaintiff decided not to burden the medical system with unnecessary visits to physicians who would give her little or no further advice other than what she had already received and followed.
FARRANT V. LAKTIN, 2011 BCCA 336 (“FARRANT”), an August 2, 2011 judgment of Neilson J.A., underscores how causation is not an “either/or” proposition. The trial judge in FARRANT held that the Plaintiff’s pre-existing spinal degeneration was the cause of his ongoing pain, and that the whiplash he suffered in the accident at issue resolved within four months. These conclusions led the trial judge to award damages of $20,000; the Plaintiff appealed.
In the case of X V. Y, 2011 BCSC 944 (“X. V. Y.”), the Court determined the appropriate apportionment of liability for a serious collision that arose out of unique factual circumstances. The Plaintiff, Mr. X., was an R.C.M.P. officer who was responding to an urgent emergency situation after the collapse of an overpass on the Lougheed Highway in Coquitlam. The Plaintiff was riding a police motorcycle with lights and sirens activated when he was struck by the Defendant, Mr. Y., who was executing a U-turn to avoid backed-up traffic near the collapsed overpass.
The evidence of the case critically disclosed that the Plaintiff had activated his emergency lights and sirens and repeatedly sounded his air horn when responding to an active “Code 3” call. Code 3 calls require responding officers to activate their lights and sirens and proceed to the scene of the emergency at a safe and reasonable speed.
In the case of PARTI V. POKORNY, 2011 BCSC 955 (“PARTI”), the Court considered whether it was appropriate to grant the Defendant an order allowing access to the recording of a case planning conference (“CPC”). The Defendant’s application was made under Rule 5-2(7) of the SUPREME COURT CIVIL RULES, which states that “proceedings at a case planning conference must be recorded, but no part of that recording may be made available to or used by any person without court order”. The Defendant in PARTI was seeking a court order which would allow a court reporter to access this recording and make a transcript based on its contents.
In PARTI, the Plaintiff sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident for which the Defendant had admitted liability. Defence counsel argued “on behalf of the defendant, and in reality ICBC” (at para. 5), that the Court’s analysis should begin with the presumption that CPC transcripts should be available for public access in conformity with the “open court principle”, unless a compelling reason for not granting access under Rule 5-2(7) exists.